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INTRODUCTION
When April Roller began making repeated trips to the restroom because of
morning sickness and pregnancy-related dizziness, her supervisor told her that
her employer did not "pay [her] to pee."' Rather than accommodating her need
for more frequent restroom visits, the supervisor offered to buy her a larger
wastebasket "so that she could take care of vomiting without having to visit the
bathroom or leave her seat."' Similarly, a sales associate was denied permission
to carry a water bottle, which she needed for her pregnancy-related urinary tract
and bladder infections. 3 A cashier was denied permission to use a stool, which
1. First Amended Complaint at 4, Roller v. Nat'1 Processing of Am., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-
02746 (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. o8-1244, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48020, at *I-
2 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009).
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she needed because her doctor had forbidden her to stand for more than six hours
at a time because of pregnancy-related circulation problems. 4 A nursing home
activity director was denied accommodation when her doctor imposed lifting re-
strictions to prevent miscarriage, despite the fact that lifting was a minor part of
her job with which her co-workers were willing to help.5 All four women eventu-
ally lost their jobs.
It is remarkable that such scenarios persist a quarter century after pregnancy
discrimination became illegal with the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA), which amended Title VII to make clear that discrimination based on
pregnancy is discrimination because of sex.' In spite of the PDA's express prohi-
bition of pregnancy discrimination, many pregnant women in need of accom-
modation continue to be fired outright. Others are forced to take family leave
much earlier than necessary. As a result, their leaves often run out before they are
ready to return to work and they are terminated for job abandonment.7
This type of employer conduct is now often prohibited as a result of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA).' Enacted in 20o8,
the ADAAA's aim was to broaden coverage in accordance with the intention of
the original ADA. 9 Many pregnancy-related impairments now are covered disa-
bilities."o This statutory change effectively supersedes prior case law, which virtu-
ally never afforded pregnant women accommodations under the ADA." Today,
the basic principle is simple: The cause of an impairment-whether rooted in
pregnancy or not-is irrelevant to the determination of whether that impairment
constitutes a disability under the Act. The ADA makes no distinction between
4. Flores v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 01-6908, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 551o, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 4, 2003).
5. Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 545-47 (7th Cir. 2011).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § zoooe(k)
(2012)).
7. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961,
1005-o6 (2013).
8. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
9. Id. § 2(b)(i), 122 Stat. at 3554 (stating that the purpose of the ADAAA is to "carry
out the ADA's objectives ... by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be avail-
able under the ADA").
io. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (2011) (stating that pregnancy is not an impairment
but that a substantially limiting pregnancy- related impairment is a disability).
ni. See Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability" and the Amended Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 444-46 (2012).
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pregnancy-related conditions and conditions not related to pregnancy." Indeed,
to create such an artificial distinction would violate the legal mandate to treat
pregnant workers the same as other workers "similar in their ability or inability
to work."" To take but one example, carpal tunnel syndrome is common among
pregnant women and also is widespread among nonpregnant individuals. 4 The
ADA affords an accommodation right to individuals with carpal tunnel syn-
drome regardless of whether the condition stems from pregnancy or from a dif-
ferent medical condition.
This Article explains how the changes effected by the ADAAA entitle women
to a broad range of accommodations for their pregnancy-related conditions un-
der federal law." Part I documents the historical obstacles faced by plaintiffs
12. See 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(h) app (2011).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2012).
14. See Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Fact Sheet, NAT'L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS
& STROKE, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/carpal-tunnel/carpal-tunnel.htm
(last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
15. Some state laws also give employees the right to pregnancy accommodations. See
ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.520(a) (2013) (entitling public officers who are pregnant to
request a transfer to a less hazardous position); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12945(a)(1)-(3)
(West 2013) (requiring employers to (i) provide reasonable temporary transfers to
pregnant employees to a "less strenuous or hazardous position" with the advice of
a physician; (2) provide reasonable unpaid leave for up to four months for a preg-
nancy-related disability; and (3) grant pregnant workers "reasonable accommoda-
tion" for a "condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condi-
tion"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-6o(a)(7)(B)-(G) (2013) (obligating employers to (i)
make a "reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employee to any suitable tempo-
rary position" if the employee reasonably believes that continued employment in
her position might cause injury to the employee or fetus; (2) provide notice of the
right to transfer; and (3) provide reasonable unpaid leave for pregnancy-related dis-
abilities); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(H) (2013) (applying only to peace of-
ficers and firefighters and requiring employers to provide pregnant employees with
reasonable temporary transfers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:342(4) (2012) (forbidding
an employer from refusing "to temporarily transfer a pregnant female employee to
a less strenuous or hazardous position for the duration of her pregnancy if she so
requests, with the advice of her physician, where such transfer can be reasonably
accommodated," and assuming the employee is otherwise qualified); MINN. STAT.
§ 363A.o8 Subd. 5, 6 (West 2013) (requiring employers to "treat women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or disabilities related to pregnancy or childbirth, the same as
other persons who are not so affected but who are similar in their ability or inability
to work, including a duty to make reasonable accommodations"); TEX. Loc. GOv'T
CODE ANN. § 18o.oo4(b)-(c) (West 2007) (entitling pregnant county and munici-
pality employees to reasonable temporary transfers, and obligating employers of
such employees to "make a reasonable effort to accommodate an employee" who
is "partially physically restricted by a pregnancy"); HAW. CODE R. §§ 12-46-107(c)
100
32 :97 2013
A SIP OF COOL WATER
claiming a right to accommodation for conditions caused by pregnancy. Part II
begins by explaining the history and purpose of the ADAAA. It then illustrates
two ways in which the ADAAA expands accommodation rights. First, it directly
expands accommodation rights under the ADA by broadening the definition of
impairment. We call this the "impairment theory." Second, it indirectly expands
accommodation rights under the PDA by expanding the group of similarly situ-
ated workers to whom a plaintiff can point to prove discriminatory treatment.
We call this the "comparator theory." Part III looks at several pregnancy cases
decided under the ADAAA to date. These cases suggest that, despite an initial
period of confusion, courts have begun to recognize that the ADA now offers
accommodations for many pregnant women.' Part IV compares the relative
benefits of filing a claim under either the PDA or the ADA, and explores which
cause of action will offer the most protection. The Article concludes by providing
some examples of pregnancy-related conditions and explaining how working
women with these conditions are entitled to accommodation under the ADAAA.
This Part highlights the parallels between common pregnancy-related conditions
and non-pregnancy-related conditions, a theme upon which we elaborate in the
Appendix to this Article.
I. HISTORICAL OBSTACLES TO PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION
Before the enactment of the ADAAA, women had little success obtaining
necessary workplace accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions. This
was due in part to the prevalence of outdated perceptions of pregnancy and
women in the workplace-and, in particular, the presumption that motherhood
and a commitment to one's job are incompatible.
(Lexis 2013) (providing that " [a]n employer shall make every reasonable accommo-
dation to the needs of the female affected by disability due to and resulting from
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions").
16. See, e.g., Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., No.11 C 8480, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1oo965 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013) (holding that the short duration of plaintiff's preg-
nancy-related condition did not preclude it from being a disability under the
ADAAA); Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-o817,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3273 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (finding plasuible a plaintiffs
disability claim arising from pregnancy-related complications ); Mayorga v. Alo-
rica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012)
(finding that pregnancy complications may fall within the ADA's definition of dis-
ability). But see, e.g., Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.
Conn. 2012) (finding that complications from pregnancy rarely constitute a disa-
bility); Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83586 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (finding that pregnancy is covered only in "extremely
rare" cases); Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-456-T-33, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79265 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012) (denying employee's claim that she was disabled due
to pregnancy).
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Neither the ADA nor the PDA has consistently provided pregnant women
with adequate relief. Pregnant women often lose suits under the PDA because
courts require them to prove discrimination because of sex by identifying a sim-
ilarly situated person (a "comparator"). 7 Frequently, no such person exists; even
when one does, courts often reject the proffered "comparator" as insufficiently
similar to the plaintiff unless the comparator is a "near twin" of the plaintiff."
The ADA, meanwhile, had been interpreted so narrowly that pregnancy-re-
lated conditions were almost never deemed to be "disabilities." Pregnancy-re-
lated conditions were excluded for a variety of reasons. First, because pregnancy-
related impairments are almost always temporary in duration, courts held that
they were not covered disabilities.'9 Second, courts interpreted the ADA's defini-
tion of "disability" in an extremely narrow manner.2 o Third, pregnancy was
deemed a "normal" physiological event and thus not a disability."' Collectively,
the result was to prevent women from ever reaching the question of whether an
accommodation was required.
A. Gender Bias and Pregnancy Discrimination
Although the presence of women in the workplace is no longer unusual, bi-
ased views of working mothers and pregnant women persist. Such "maternal-
wall" bias includes both descriptive bias, which reflects assumptions about how
mothers will behave," and prescriptive bias, which reflects a belief that pregnant
17. See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (sth Cir. 1998) (rejecting plain-
tiff's claim on the grounds that employees injured on the job are not similarly situ-
ated to pregnant employees); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7 th Cir.
1994) (ruling against plaintiff where she failed to identify a similarly situated male
comparator).
18. See Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1661 (2011); see also Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305,
306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that "men are physiologically incapable of pumping
breast milk, so plaintiff cannot show that she was treated less favorably than simi-
larly situated men").
19. See, e.g., Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (finding pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA because it is too short in
duration).
20. See Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 331, 334 (2010).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (1996) (" [C]onditions, such as pregnancy, that are not
the result of a physiological disorder are not impairments.").
22. See Monica Biernat, Faye J. Crosby & Joan C. Williams, The Maternal Wall: Research
and Policy Perspectives on Discrimination Against Mothers, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 675, 679
(2004).
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women and mothers do not belong in the workplace at all. 3 Social science studies
show that motherhood triggers strong negative competence and commitment as-
sumptions. The leading study found that mothers were seventy-nine percent less
likely to be hired, were only half as likely to be promoted, were offered an average
of $n,ooo less in salary, and were held to higher performance and punctuality
standards than identical women without children." Other studies have docu-
mented discrimination against pregnant women specifically. 5 As a result, women
who seek accommodations for a condition arising out of pregnancy frequently
meet with hostility fueled by gender stereotyping. Often this hostility is driven by
the conviction that it is not fair to require employers to hire pregnant women
because to do so entails special or preferential treatment, a contention common-
place in ADA case law prior to the ADAAA."
If uninterrupted, this sentiment will continue to impede courts' ability to
decide pregnancy accommodation cases free of maternal-wall bias. Courts' intu-
ition that pregnant women are asking for "special treatment" reflects the schema
of an ideal worker who starts to work in early adulthood and works full time for
forty continuous years, needing no accommodations for pregnancy or child-
birth." These characteristics describe a population consisting almost exclusively
of men.
23. For a review of studies on bias triggered by pregnancy and maternity, see Stephen
Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1369-72 (20o8). Other related studies include Stephen Benard &
Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty, 24
GENDER& SOC'Y 616 (2010), which attributed the motherhood penalty in part to the
perception that mothers are less committed and competent than other workers;
and Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Motherhood: A Potential Source of
Bias in Employment Decisions, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 189 (2008), which found that
mothers were perceived as less competent.
24. Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood
Penalty?, 112 AM. J. Soc. 1297, 1316 (2007).
25. Benard, Paik & Correll, supra note 23, at 1369-72 (summarizing studies concluding
that pregnant women were less likely to be hired, given lower performance ratings,
and found to be poorer managers than otherwise identical nonpregnant counter-
parts).
26. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v.
Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2006); Urbano v. Cont'1 Airlines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 204, 2o6 (5th Cir. 1998); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-2586,
2011 WL 665321 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011), afi'd, 707 F-3d 437 (4 th Cir. 2013); Andrews-
Filas v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., No. 06-6026, 2006 WL 3743709, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 19, 20o6).
27. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000).
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Yet men too have accommodation needs that are particular to their sex, such
as accommodations needed due to prostate and testicular cancer. These accom-
modations are not viewed as "special treatment" by employers. Nor do employers
propose to charge men higher insurance rates due to a higher incidence of drunk
driving and smoking among men. 8 If these costs, which are particular to men,
are not seen as affording special treatment to men-why, then, is accommoda-
tion of pregnancy seen as giving special treatment to women? The reason is sim-
ple. The costs associated uniquely with men are seen as ordinary costs of doing
business-facts of life an employer copes with as the part of hiring a workforce.
Costs uniquely associated with women are, in sharp contrast, considered some-
thing extra that employers should not have to shoulder. 9
Pregnant women who need workplace accommodations are not demanding
"special treatment." Rather, they are simply demanding what men already have:
the right to accommodations for the kinds of physical challenges that, Congress
has decided, an employer can be expected to cope with as a cost of hiring a work-
force.
B. Statutory Protections for Pregnant Women
The two primary federal laws that allow for workplace accommodations to
women with pregnancy-related impairments are the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.30 The power of these statutes to pro-
vide pregnant women with accommodations has been vastly expanded by the
ADAAA.
28. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vital Signs: Alchohol-Impaired Driving
Among Adults-United States, 2oo, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1351,
1351 (2011); Adult Cigarette Smoking in the United States: Current Estimate, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 5, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco
/data-statistics/fact sheets/adult data/cig.smoking/; cf City of Los Angeles v.
Manhart, 345 U.S.702 (1978) (holding that employers cannot charge women higher
pension contributions than men, on the grounds that they cost more because they
live longer).
29. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994); Richard A. Posner,
Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191.
30. Another relevant federal statute is the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
which qualifying employees can use to take up to 12 weeks of job-guaranteed, un-
paid leave for the birth of a child or to address a "serious health condition," among
other things. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2653 (2012). The statute only applies to workers who
have worked for their employer for at least one year and at least 1,250 hours, and
the employer must have at least 5o employees within a 75-mile radius. Id. The stat-
ute allows only for leave, which is always unpaid and which may be involuntary
(i.e., an employer may obligate a pregnant woman to use her FMLA leave rather
than accommodate her at work). Accordingly, it is often of little help to pregnant
women needing accommodations, and may in fact result in women losing their
jobs because they are forced to take leave early in their pregnancies and use up their
104
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i. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
The PDA was enacted in 1978 to make clear that pregnancy discrimination is
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
However, the language of the PDA does not merely prohibit discrimination be-
cause of pregnancy. It also mandates that "women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work."" While not specifically requiring the accommodation of preg-
nancy-related conditions, the plain statutory language thus requires that employ-
ers place pregnant women with impairments on the same footing as nonpregnant
workers with similar impairments." That is, an employer must make an accom-
modation for pregnant employees if the employer has or would have done so for
any of its nonpregnant employees.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA, passed in 1990, prohibits discrimination "against a qualified indi-
vidual on the basis of disability." 4 Such discrimination is defined to include "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or em-
ployee," unless making accommodations would result in "undue hardship" to
the employer." To be entitled to accommodation under the ADA, a worker must
demonstrate that she has a disability; that she can perform the essential functions
of the job with a reasonable accommodation; and that the employer has been
12 weeks before their child is even born. For more on this topic, see Cox, supra note
n1, at 454-59-
31. Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2012)). Title
VII provides that employers may not "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's [sex]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000C-2(a)(1) (2012).
32. Id. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added).
33. Indeed, the PDA was enacted specifically in order to overturn a Supreme Court
ruling that it was not sex discrimination to exclude pregnancy from a private em-
ployer's temporary disability policy. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 989-98.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
35. Id. § 12112(b)(5) (A).
36. Id.
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given notice of the need for accommodation.37 In order to satisfy the "disability"
requirement, the worker must show that her condition qualifies as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her] major life ac-
tivities."3
C. Obstacles to Pregnancy Accommodation Under the PDA
A major obstacle to accommodation under the PDA is that some circuits re-
quire plaintiffs to produce comparator evidence-that is, evidence that similarly
situated employees who are not pregnant were treated more advantageously.39
When courts assess whether comparators are "similar in their ability or inability
to work,"40 they often have excluded many coworkers who would seem to fit this
description well.41 Similarly, courts often fail to acknowledge that, while "Title
VII generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that [a comparator] be simi-
larly situated in all respects[,] . . . the PDA requires only that the [comparator]
be similar in his or her 'ability or inability to work."'4 Many courts have con-
flated the PDA's requirement with Title VII's "similarly situated" comparator
standards, requiring, for instance, that a pregnant woman find a comparator to
be comparable in all respects.43 Thus, in Tysinger v. Police Department of Za-
nesville, the court found that the plaintiff could not use as comparators two male
37. See Mzyk v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 Fed. App'x. 13, 16 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (unpublished); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir.
2005); Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2004);
Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F-3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (A).
39. Some courts insist that the plaintiff produce comparators. See, e.g., Arizanovska v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 90-1404, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107405 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
22, 2011); Barton v. G.E.C., Inc., No. 09-1123, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26863 (M.D. La.
Mar. 16, 2011). A 2002 study found that six circuits generally hold that a plaintiff's
failure to produce a comparator is fatal to a prima facie case. Ernest F. Lidge III,
The Courts' Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination
Law, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831, 849 (2002). The Center for WorkLife Law has long argued
that no comparator is necessary, an approach that has been adopted in some courts
and in the EEOC'S 2007 Enforcement Guidance. See Joan C. Williams, Dir., Ctr. for
WorkLife Law, Written Testimony Before the EEOC (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm.
40. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 1015-17.
41. See Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011);
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Compar-
ators, 6o ALA. L. REV. 191, 193 n.1 (2009).
42. Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 1oo F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. See id.
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police officers who, although disabled, had not asked for a workplace accommo-
dation." "[E]ven though the temporarily disabled officers admitted that they
could not fully perform their jobs, the fact that they did not request a temporary
reassignment sufficiently distinguished their situation from that of the pregnant
officer/plaintiff to defeat her pregnancy discrimination claim."45
Another challenge for plaintiffs making a claim under the PDA is the fact
that courts frequently determine whether a comparator is similar in her ability or
inability to work by looking to the reason for the underlying impairment. As a
result, there is a split in the circuits as to whether a policy precluding workplace
accommodations for any off-the-job "injury"-including pregnancy-is con-
sistent with the PDA.46 Some courts reason that a policy distinguishing between
on-the-job and off-the-job injuries is "pregnancy blind" and, thus, not discrimi-
natory.47 Other courts and commentators have noted that this approach is incon-
sistent with the plain text of the PDA,48 which requires simply that the proffered
comparator be similar in his or her ability or inability to work.4 9
44. 463 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2006).
45. Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers and
the Workplace-Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are Today, 22 J.L. &
HEALTH 197, 213 (2009).
46. Compare Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that
an employer did not violate the PDA by granting light duty assignments only to
employees injured on the job), with Ensley-Gaines, oo F.3d 1220 (finding that a
pregnant employee was similarly situated to limited-duty employees who were in-
jured on the job).
47. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446 (4 th Cir. 2013); Serednyj v.
Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011); Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206.
48. See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 fl7 (loth Cir.
2000) ("If a plaintiff is compared only to nonpregnant employees injured off the
job, her case would be 'short circuited' at the prima facie stage . . . ."); Ensley-
Gaines, oo F.3d at 1226 ("While Title VII generally requires that a plaintiff demon-
strate that the employee who received more favorable treatment be similarly situ-
ated 'in all respects,' the PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or
her 'ability or inability to work."' (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577,
583 (6th Cir. 1992)); Germain v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45434 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009); Sumner v. Wayne Cnty., 94 F. Supp. 2d 822,
826 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("The proper focus under the comparison prong is whether
the employees are similar in their ability or inability to work, regardless of the
source of the injury or illness."). But see Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637,
641 n.1 (6th Cir. 20o6) (granting summary judgment for employer and distinguish-
ing Ensley-Gaines).
49. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 1022 (" [The PDA] requires that employers' treatment
of pregnant employees be compared to their treatment of all employees 'similar in
their ability to work or not work,' not all employees similar in the cause of their
ability to work or not work."); see also Emily Martin, Vice President and Gen.
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It is important to recognize that comparator evidence is only one way of
proving a PDA case. Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that an adverse employ-
ment action is because of sex; the PDA requires plaintiffs to prove that they were
not treated "the same" as others with a "similar ability or inability to work.""o
Nothing in the language of the PDA requires limiting probative evidence to com-
parator evidence. Appropriately, many courts allow plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment even if they have not identified comparators." A variety of methods
permit proof of disparate treatment without comparators, including evidence
that the adverse action was based on sex stereotyping" or occurred under cir-
cumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (such as temporal prox-
imity53 or remarks indicating pregnancy-related animus54 ). In addition, a plaintiff
can be her own comparator by showing that she was treated one way when not
pregnant and another way after announcing her pregnancy.55 Nonetheless, when
courts adhere (as they often have) to the "near-twin" comparator requirement,
pregnant women needing accommodations frequently found themselves out of
luck. 6
D. Obstacles to Pregnancy Accommodation Under the Pre-Amendment ADA
Under the pre-amendment ADA, accommodations were occasionally avail-
able to pregnant women suffering very serious complications.57 For the most part,
however, pregnancy-related conditions were deemed insufficient to qualify as
Counsel, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Written Testimony Before the EEOC (February
15, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/martin.cfm; Joanna L. Gross-
man & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Ac-
commodation Act's Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 36 (2009).
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe(k), 20ooe-2(a) (2012).
5i. This can happen, for example, in cases where the adverse action violates company
policy. See Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1255 (ith Cir. 2012).
See generally CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, JOAN C. WILLIAMS & GARY E. PHELAN,
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION ch. 2 (forthcoming 2014) (on file with au-
thors) (discussing this phenomenon).
52. See CALVERT, WILLIAMS & PHELAN supra note 5i, ch. 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 1016 ("As a practical matter ... courts often require
comparators and will dismiss a case or grant summary judgment if a plaintiff lacks
them.").
57. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997) (de-
termining that premature labor could qualify as an impairment under the pre-
amendment ADA).
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disabilities. Courts found such conditions fell short of a covered disability for
three primary reasons: (1) pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions were
considered too short in duration to qualify as impairments under the pre-amend-
ment ADA; (2) the analysis of whether an impairment "substantially limited" a
"major life activity" was given an overly restrictive interpretation which excluded
pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions; and (3) conditions related to a
"normal pregnancy" were eliminated from consideration because they were not
considered impairmentsi8
i. The Duration Requirement
Prior to the ADAAA, many courts held that pregnancy-related impairments
that subsided shortly after the termination of pregnancy and left no lasting harm
were not substantially limiting. 9 This reasoning was premised on the pre-
ADAAA, judicially constructed standard that an impairment is only disabling
when its impact is "permanent or long term.""o In support of this view, courts
often quoted a portion of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
then-current interpretive guidance, which stated that "temporary, non-chronic
impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,
are usually not disabilities."'
2. Restrictive Interpretation of "Major Life Activity" and "Substan-
tially Limits"
Another obstacle to establishing disability based on a pregnancy-related con-
dition was the severe set of requirements courts applied for a condition to qualify
as "substantially limiting" a "major life activity" under the pre-amendment ADA.
Pre-ADAAA courts limited "major life activities" to activities "of central im-
portance to most people's daily lives."" Episodic or intermittent conditions were
not typically considered impairments because they did not consistently interfere
58. Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 974, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
59. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F.3d 540, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2011); Payne
v. Student Assistance Comm., No. 07-981, 2009 WL 1468610, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May
22, 2009); Leahr v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., No. 96 C 1388, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10601, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1997).
60. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (1991); see, e.g., McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 95
(3d Cir. 1995).
62. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 ("We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in per-
forming manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or se-
verely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people's daily lives.").
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with major life activities." Similarly, courts held that to be substantially limiting,
a condition must "prevent[] or severely restrict[]" accomplishment of a major
life activity.6 4 Under these interpretations, serious limitations frequently caused
by pregnancy-related conditions were deemed not substantially limiting.65
3. The "Normal-Pregnancy" Doctrine
EEOC regulations accompanying both the pre-amendment and amended
ADA state that pregnancy is not per se a disability because it is considered a phys-
iological condition, rather than a "disorder.""6 Citing this language, pre-ADAAA
courts frequently held that pregnancy-related conditions were never covered by
the ADA except in "extremely rare" cases."' Courts also commonly asserted that
no condition related to pregnancy could ever constitute an impairment. Under
this interpretation, a pregnant woman seeking ADA protection had to prove that
her limitations stemmed from a medical condition that predated her pregnancy
and was exacerbated by it.68
Taken together, these holdings sent the message that pregnancy contami-
nates a limitation that otherwise would qualify as a disability-a contention tra-
ditionally called the "normal-pregnancy doctrine." This doctrine is more aptly
63. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that a
plaintiff with epilepsy was not substantially limited in a major life activity by "rela-
tively infrequent" seizures); Zirpei v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., ii F.3d 80, 81 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff suffering from intermittent panic attacks was not
substantially limited in a major life activity).
64. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
65. See Zahurance v. Valley Packaging Indus., Inc., 397 Fed. App'x. 246, 248 (7th Cir.
2010) (holding that a twenty-pound lifting restriction is not substantially limiting);
Mays v. Principi, 3o F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (expressing doubt as to whether
a ten-pound lifting restriction is substantially limiting); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 297 F-3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (determining a pharmacist with diabetes was not
covered by the ADA, in part because of mitigating measures such as diet and insulin
injections); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that the inability to perform "heavy lifting" does not substantially limit ability
to lift); Kennebrew v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. oi CIV 1654, 2002 WL 265120, at *18
n.32 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2002) (finding no evidence that a plaintiff's gestational dia-
betes "was substantial enough to constitute a disability for ADA purposes"). But see
Kapche v. Holder, 677 F.3d 454 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (interpreting pre-ADAAA law to
support a verdict for the plaintiff relying on evidence that diabetes substantially
limited the major life activity of eating).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (1996) ("[Clonditions, such as pregnancy, that are not
the result of a physiological disorder are not impairments.").
67. See, e.g., Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F. Supp. 2d 16 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
68. See, e.g., Patterson ex rel. Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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called the "pregnancy-contamination doctrine." Under the pregnancy-contami-
nation doctrine, an impairment that would entitle the plaintiff to an ADA ac-
commodation if it stemmed from any condition other than pregnancy would not
entitle the same plaintiff to the same accommodation if the symptoms stemmed
from pregnancy. This logic has never been applied to any physiological process
other than pregnancy. Aging is a good example since it is a normal physiological
process that commonly produces impairments. For example, more than forty
percent of men over the age of sixty-five have overactive bladders. 9 But no court
we are aware of has ever proposed to exclude impairments that stem from aging
on the grounds that aging is a normal physiological process.
Thus, one court held that a plaintiff who suffered from "periodic nausea,
vomiting, dizziness, severe headaches, and fatigue" was not protected by the ADA
due to the "common knowledge that all of these symptoms, at some degree of
severity, are part and parcel of a normal pregnancy." 70 Another court held that a
plaintiff who experienced morning sickness, stress, nausea, back pain, swelling,
and headaches was not impaired under the ADA because "[a]ll of the physiolog-
ical conditions and changes related to a pregnancy also are not impairments un-
less they exceed normal ranges or are attributable to some disorder."7' And yet
another court found that ovarian cysts accompanying a pregnancy did not con-
stitute an impairment because "pregnancy and related medical conditions do
not, absent unusual circumstances, constitute a 'physical impairment' under the
ADA."7 As a result of these strict limitations, few plaintiffs won pre-amendment
ADA claims.
These sharp limitations on ADA coverage were part of the courts' strained
interpretation of the Act's purpose-an interpretation of the intent of Congress
that the ADAAA was designed to correct. By 2006, defendants were winning
ninety-seven percent of all ADA cases resolved in court, most of which turned on
whether the plaintiff (whether pregnant or not) was entitled to protected status.73
The passage of the ADAAA changed the statutory framework in important ways
to give effect to the underlying goals of the ADA.
69. See Claus G. Roehrborn & John D. McConnell, Etiology, Pathophysiology, Epidemi-
ology and Natural History of Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, in CAMPBELL'S UROLOGY
1297 (Patrick C. Walsh et al., eds., 2002).
70. Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002), affd, 340
F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2003).
71. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996).
72. Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1o9, 119 (D.N.H. 1995).
73. Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination
Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 303, 305
(2005).
111
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
II. THE ADAAA AND A NEW ENTITLEMENT TO PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION
The 2008 amendments to the ADA brought new possibilities to women seek-
ing accommodations for pregnancy-related conditions in the workplace. The
clear language of the statute and its accompanying EEOC regulations unambig-
uously encompass pregnancy-related conditions. Moreover, with Congress' res-
toration of the intent of the original ADA to provide coverage that is inclusive,
rather than exclusive, with respect to employees who are entitled to protection
under the Act, the accommodation rights of pregnant women experiencing com-
parable impairments are also expanded.
A. Overview of the ADAAA
When the original ADA was enacted in 1990, it was intended to provide
equality for individuals with disabilities in the workplace. In subsequent years, a
series of Supreme Court decisions 74 so narrowed the scope of protection that a
bipartisan coalition in Congress determined it was necessary to amend the stat-
ute." The result was the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act
(ADAAA), which took effect on January 1, 2009.76 The goal of the ADAAA was to
"restore the proper balance and application of the ADA by clarifying and broad-
ening the definition of disability, and to increase eligibility for the protections of
the ADA.""7 The term "disability" was now to "be construed in favor of broad
coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of this chapter."78 Congress hoped that this would provide a level of
coverage that was "generous and inclusive"79 in order to "afford people with dis-
abilities the freedom to participate in our community, free from discrimination
and its segregating effects.""o
74. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (creating ar-
duous standards for the terms "substantially limits" and "major life activities");
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (holding that mitigating
measures could be taken into account in determining whether an individual is dis-
abled).
75. See Americans with Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2o6, H.R. 6258, 1o9th Cong.
(2006).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
77. 154 CONG. REC. S884o (daily ed. Sept. 16, 20o8) (statement of the managers).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).
79. 154 CONG. REC. H8288 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 20o8) (statement of Rep. Miller).
80. 154 CONG. REC. H8294 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (joint statement of Reps. Hoyer and
Sensenbrenner).
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Both the statute and the ensuing EEOC regulations (issued in early 2011)
make clear that courts should not focus on the issue of whether a plaintiffs im-
pairment was sufficiently limiting to constitute an eligible disability."' One ex-
press purpose of the ADAAA is:
[T]o convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and ...
that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability
under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis."
The EEOC similarly stated that "[t]he primary object of attention in cases
brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with
their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the indi-
vidual meets the definition of disability."83 The EEOC regulations also state, "the
Amendments Act and the amended regulations make plain that the emphasis in
ADA cases now should be squarely on the merits and not on the initial coverage
question."4 Accordingly, the key issue in ADA cases-in pregnancy contexts as
in every other context-is whether an employer can accommodate a disabled
worker without undue hardship.
The ADAAA sought to accomplish its goal of expanding coverage through
specific changes to the statute's language. These revisions included clarifying and
expanding the definitions of "substantially limits" and "major life activities," as
well as easing the duration requirement. Thus, as a result of the ADAAA, many
conditions that would not have been covered under the pre-amendment ADA
are now considered disabilities.5 When one of the newly covered conditions
arises in connection with a pregnancy, the pregnant woman who experiences the
condition qualifies for protection under the ADA. This is the core of the impair-
ment theory: Even though the statute is not pregnancy-specific, it broadens the
base of conditions for which pregnant women can receive protection and accom-
modation. Under the comparator theory, the additional protections of the
ADAAA are translated into additional protections under the PDA. This is true
because the ADAAA expands the pool of comparators to whom a pregnant
woman may point when seeking to use comparators as evidence of discrimina-
tion under the PDA.
81. ADA Amendments Act § 2, 122 Stat. AT 3554 (20o8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2011).
82. ADA Amendments Act § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) app.
84. ID. § 163 o.2(j)(1)(iii).
85. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2012)
(holding that a worker suffering from asthma and high blood pressure did not have
a disability); Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter LLP, No. 10-24, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133343,
at *23 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (finding that, although obesity was not a disability
before the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, it may be under the current regime).
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B. The Impairment Theory
The impairment theory holds that, just as the amended ADA now protects
vast numbers of workers whose conditions would not have qualified as disabili-
ties prior to the passage of the ADAAA, it also protects women affected by iden-
tical conditions that happen to be caused by pregnancy. Thus, plaintiffs experi-
encing a broad range of pregnancy-related conditions will be able to establish a
right to accommodation since pregnancies can substantially limit the major bod-
ily functions listed in the statute, including the digestive, bladder, brain, respira-
tory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.8 6 The amendments to
the ADA address the four key obstacles pregnant women faced when bringing
claims under the pre-amendment statute: duration, severity, undue limitations
on the meaning of "major life activity," and the pregnancy-contamination doc-
trine.
i. Rejection of the Duration Requirement
The regulations accompanying the ADAAA eliminated the duration require-
ment from the definition of "disability."17 No longer are impairments that last
only a short time deemed ineligible to be considered a disability. The EEOC reg-
ulations now expressly state that "[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or ex-
pected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting."" This means
that a condition likely to subside at or before the end of the pregnancy can be
considered a disability. However, the interpretive guidance to the regulations
nonetheless cautions that "[t]he duration of an impairment is one factor that is
relevant in determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life
activity. Impairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not
covered, although they may be covered if sufficiently severe."'9 The phrase "a
short period of time" is not expressly defined, but, when viewed in conjunction
with the regulations' language recognizing that conditions lasting less than six
months may be disabilities, it seems that it must be a very short period indeed.
Furthermore, the guidance makes clear that even very short-term conditions may
be impairments if they are sufficiently severe. For example, this means that a
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2012); see 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(i)(1)(ii) (2013).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(j)(1)(ix) app.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
88. 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(j)(1)(ix). For instance, "if an individual has a back impairment
that results in a twenty-pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he is
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and therefore covered under
the first prong of the definition of disability." Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) app.
89. Id. § 163 o.2(j)(1)(ix) app.
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woman experiencing debilitating nausea for just a few weeks (or even less) may
be found to have an impairment.
2. Easing of the "Substantially Limits" Standard
In enacting the ADAAA, Congress noted that the term "substantially limits"
had been narrowly interpreted by the courts. The findings and purposes located
in the introductory note of the ADAAA state that the Supreme Court has "inter-
preted the term 'substantially limits' to require a greater degree of limitation than
was intended by Congress" and that the EEOC's interpretation of "substantially
limits" to mean "significantly restricts" created too high a burden.9 o In order to
effect the intent of the ADA, the ADAAA states "that whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity" should not "be interpreted strictly to cre-
ate a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled" or to mean "prevents or
severely restricts."9'
The EEOC regulations of the amended ADA reinforce the reduced thresh-
old.92 First, they expressly recognize that the ADAAA's broadened definitions en-
compass pregnancy-related impairments. Indeed, the regulations state that "a
pregnancy-related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a
disability under the first prong of the definition."93 Guidance issued by the EEOC
cites gestational diabetes and preeclampsia as examples of pregnancy-related im-
pairments that may be considered disabilities under the law.9 4 Next, the regula-
tions note that " [t] he term 'substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in fa-
vor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the
ADA. 'Substantially limits' is not meant to be a demanding standard."5 Moreo-
ver, the regulations state that the proper construction of "substantially limits"
will "require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for
90. ADA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54
(citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)).
91. ADA Amendments Act § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 3554.
92. Note that these regulations should be granted significant Chevron deference, given
that the ADAAA explicitly grants the agency the authority to interpret the law. 42
U.S.C. § 12117 (2006) (granting EEOC interpretive authority); see Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (holding that
agency regulations interpreting ambiguous statutory language are due judicial def-
erence).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (emphasis added).
94. Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/pregnancy.cfm (last visited June 20, 2013).
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2011).
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'substantially limits' applied prior to the ADAAA." 96 Finally, the regulations af-
firm that "[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict,
the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered
substantially limiting."7 Thus, as a result of both revisions to the statutory lan-
guage and the new EEOC regulations, many more individuals are considered
"substantially limited" under the amended ADA.
The ADAAA further provides that "[t]he determination of whether an im-
pairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,"9' allowing treatable impair-
ments to qualify as disabilities. Thus, it would seem that a plaintiff who success-
fully controls her gestational diabetes but requires modifications to her work
schedule to take meals and check her blood sugar has a protected disability,
although she would not have under the pre-amendment ADA. And any condi-
tion that, left unmitigated, would result in miscarriage should be a disability on
the grounds that it substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction.
Courts should no longer penalize pregnant plaintiffs for the countless methods
they use to work through pregnancy-related conditions. The ability to work
through the symptoms of a condition is not an indication that the condition isn't
substantially limiting.
The statute also requires that courts evaluate episodic impairments in their
active states. The amended ADA states that "[a]n impairment that is episodic or
in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when
active."99 For example, in the case where pregnancy has exacerbated hypertension
or a vasovagal response resulting in occasional fainting episodes, courts should
consider the impact of the condition during an episode.'
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (2012); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) ("The determination
of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made
without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.").
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(Vii) (2013) ("An impairment
that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major
life activity when active.").
ioo. Where denying an accommodation would likely result in an employee being unable
to perform the essential functions of the job, the employer needs to provide the
requested accommodation absent undue hardship. See, e.g., Randolph v. Rodgers,
170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999); Buckingham v. U.S. Postal Serv., 998 F.2d 735, 743
(9th Cir. 1993).
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3. Expanding the "Major Life Activity" Standard
In addition to easing the "substantially limits" standard, the ADAAA clari-
fied the definition of the "major life activities." Before the ADA was amended,
the term "major life activities" was interpreted by courts to refer to "those activ-
ities that are of central importance to daily life.""o' The ADAAA replaced that in-
terpretation with a non-exhaustive list of activities, which now includes, among
other activities, "performing manual tasks... sleeping, eating, walking, standing,
lifting, bending,... breathing,. . . concentrating, thinking,. . . and working."lO2
The definition also now includes the operation of a "major bodily function, in-
cluding but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth,
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine,
and reproductive functions.""o3
As a result of this new definition, many pregnancy-related impairments fall
under the ADA because they interfere with the operation of major bodily func-
tions or with other major life activities.o 4 For example, lumbar lordosis, the sway-
backed posture caused by a growing belly and the fact that pregnancy hormones
loosen up the joints, can cause back pain that interferes with lifting, bending, and
standing. Similarly, pregnancy-related syncope, which is dizziness or fainting re-
sulting from increased blood flow to the uterus and fetus, interferes with a
woman's ability to deal with heat, stress, or exertion. These are just two examples
of conditions that are now covered by the ADA (and that just happen to result
from pregnancy).o5 More examples are detailed in the Appendix.
io. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1)(i).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii).
104. At a minimum, even pregnant women who fail to meet the definition of "disabled"
under the ADA may have a viable ADA retaliation claim if they request an accom-
modation and believe their employers later retaliated against them for doing so.
When an individual believes, in good faith, that she is entitled to an accommoda-
tion under the ADA, she is protected by the ADA's anti-retaliation provision even
if the impairment in question does not rise to the level of a disability under the
ADA. See, e.g., Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 20o6); Krouse v.
Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1997).
105. The Appendix describes more of the pregnancy-related disabilities women can ex-
perience. It is not an exhaustive list of such disabilities and it is important for em-
ployees, employers and litigators to consult with medical experts when determining
whether an employee has a qualifying disability which requires accommodation ab-
sent undue hardship.
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4. The Pregnancy-Contamination Doctrine Runs Contrary to the
ADAAA's Mandate of Broad Coverage
In amending the ADA, Congress made explicit its intention to eliminate hur-
dles that had created a "demanding standard to qualify as disabled."o' The preg-
nancy-contamination doctrine is precisely such a hurdle, and is inconsistent with
the clear statutory language requiring that the definition of disability "be con-
strued in favor of broad coverage of individuals."o 7 The mandate that the post-
amendment ADA's coverage be "broad," "inclusive," and "generous"o' means
that courts now should primarily focus not on whether a woman's pregnancy-
related condition qualifies as a disability, but rather on whether her employer has
engaged in an interactive process and can accommodate her without undue hard-
ship.
Indeed, to continue to accept the pregnancy-contamination doctrine follow-
ing the amendments to the ADA would create a far more demanding standard
for pregnant women than for any other group of workers. For instance, carpal
tunnel syndrome arises both in the general population and (far more fre-
quently)' 9 in pregnant women. Under the pregnancy-contamination doctrine, a
nonpregnant worker with carpal tunnel syndrome would be covered by the ADA,
but a pregnant worker with precisely the same medical condition would not be
covered if her carpal tunnel syndrome arose as a result of pregnancy. Under such
logic, pregnancy contaminates an otherwise covered disability, rendering that
condition unprotected under the ADA.
The language and purpose of the ADAAA and its accompanying EEOC reg-
ulations make clear that a woman cannot be denied accommodations at work
purely because her impairment stems from pregnancy (even a supposed "normal
pregnancy"), because it is short-term, or because it does not qualify as an impair-
ment in the first place on the grounds that it is not "substantially limiting." The
amended ADA is broader and more encompassing. It emphasizes the particular
condition, and not the cause of that condition, and thus plainly covers preg-
nancy-related conditions as well as numerous non-pregnancy-related conditions
lo6. ADA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(2008) ("[C]ourts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a
range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities.").
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (A).
i08. 154 CONG. REC. H8289 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 20o8) (statement of Rep. Nadler); 154
CONG. REC. H8288 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Miller).
109. While up to sixty-two percent of pregnant women develop carpal tunnel syndrome
due to swelling and fluid retention caused by pregnancy, only three percent of the
general population suffers from the condition. See Robert H. Ablove & Tova S.
Ablove, Prevalence of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome in Pregnant Women, 108 WISC. MED.
J. 194, 194 (2009).
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that were previously excluded. In addition to these statutory changes, which ex-
pand protection for pregnant women under the ADA, the ADAAA also allows for
greater access under the PDA by creating a larger class of nonpregnant workers
who are entitled to accommodations. This is addressed by our "comparator the-
ory" in the following section.
C. The Comparator Theory
As observed by Professors Jeannette Cox and Deborah A. Widiss,"o the
ADAAA improves access to accommodations not just directly but also indirectly,
by way of the PDA. Where an employer provides help with lifting for an employee
limited by a cardiac condition, for example, the employer must also provide help
with lifting for a pregnant employee whose healthcare provider has limited the
amount of weight she should lift. This stems from the PDA's mandate that
"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.""'
Employees who believe they are being discriminated against based on their
pregnancies may bring disparate-treatment claims under the PDA. A common
method of establishing a disparity in treatment using indirect evidence"' is to use
comparators. In such situations," 3 the fact that the ADAAA extends accommo-
dations to more employees with disabilities expands the range of comparators
available to pregnant workers. Under the comparator theory, a pregnant woman
might well gain accommodation rights for conditions that are not "impairments"
under the ADA.
no. See Cox, supra note ii, at 466-68; Widiss, supra note 7, at 1004-10, 1018-35.
il. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2013) (emphasis added).
112. A PDA plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or indirect evi-
dence. Direct evidence is "evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact
without inference or presumption." Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d
1249, 1255 (nth Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Such
evidence would include, for instance, an employer's blatant discriminatory re-
marks. Indirect evidence is circumstantial, and is typically provided via the burden-
shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Logi-
cally, where there is direct evidence of discrimination, presenting indirect evi-
dence-and, thus, comparators-is not necessary.
113. To assert a prima facie right to accommodation using the commonly applied
McDonnell Douglas test, a woman must show that her employer is aware that she is
pregnant or "affected by pregnancy," has been performing her job satisfactorily, has
been subject to an adverse employment action, and that she was treated differently
from other similarly situated employees. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 637 F.3d
729, 736 (7th Cir. 2011).
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The use of such comparators from the plaintiffs workplace is standard and
embodies what we call the "de facto comparator theory." However, this should
not be the only way that plaintiffs may obtain accommodations under the PDA.
Instead, under what we call the "de jure comparator theory," pregnant plaintiffs
should have access to accommodations if they can prove that a nonpregnant
worker with similar limitations would be entitled to reasonable accommodations
under the ADA or other disability-accommodation laws, were he or she to exist
in the workplace at that time.
i. The Prospective Impact of the ADAAA on PDA Claims: The "De
Facto Comparator Theory"
The de facto comparator theory holds that, where a plaintiff chooses to prove
her case through the use of comparators within her own workplace, the ADAAA's
shift towards accommodation of a broader range of workers, including those who
are temporarily disabled, dramatically expands the pool of potential compara-
tors.
As discussed above, the ADAAA makes accommodation a more widespread
practice. Early outcomes of cases proceeding under the amended ADA suggest
that accommodations are now available for a range of conditions that can cause
limitations similar to those experienced by pregnant women.114 Some of these
conditions cause the same symptoms suffered by nonpregnant workers as a result
of a different disease. The sardonic comment that the PDA entitles pregnant
women to be treated just as badly as everyone else 15 loses some of its sting as the
standard of treatment for everyone else improves.
One potential impact of the ADAAA on the PDA involves employer policies
that limit accommodations to workers who were injured on the job. Such policies
114. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bala Nursing & Ret. Ctr., No. 11-5771, 2012 WL 2581057 (E.D. Pa.
July 3, 2012) (allowing a plaintiff suffering from anemia and associated standing,
walking, and sleeping problems to survive summary judgment); Gibbs v. ADS Al-
liance Data Sys., Inc., No. 10-2421, 2011 WL 3205779 (D. Kan. July 28, 2011) (denying
employer's summary judgment motion on employee's ADA claim stemming from
carpal tunnel syndrome); Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-514, 2011 WL 2713737 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2011) (holding that the ADAAA does not mandate strict durational re-
quirements); Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., No. 10-91, 2011 WL 1832952
(E.D. Tex. May 13, 2011) (denying a motion for partial summary judgment on
grounds that renal cancer is capable of being classified as a disability despite plain-
tiff's remission).
115. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Employers can
treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant em-
ployees, even to the point of conditioning the availability of an employment benefit
on an employee's decision to return to work after the end of the medical disability
that pregnancy causes." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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have been regularly used to deny pregnant workers light duty and other accom-
modations."' Such policies were never enforceable when workers injured off the
job were entitled to accommodation under the ADA."' But because of the highly
constricted scope of the pre-amendment ADA, such situations were rare."' Now
that many more people injured both on and off the job are eligible for ADA ac-
commodation, however, the place of injury is moot for ADA purposes. An em-
ployer's ability to offer preferential treatment for on-the-job injuries applies only
to the significantly smaller class of persons who cannot qualify as disabled under
the ADA."9
One court has suggested that potential comparators are not sufficiently sim-
ilar if one, but not the other, would be entitled to accommodation under the
ADA. 2 0 In Young v. United Parcel Service, UPS declined to accommodate a preg-
nant woman's lifting restrictions on the grounds that such accommodations were
available only to employees with "a permanent impairment cognizable under the
ADA."'' 'The Fourth Circuit determined that such a policy did not violate the
PDA because it was "pregnancy-blind," and that to hold otherwise would consti-
tute "preferential treatment" for pregnant women."' Professor Widiss points out
that, if this interpretation were widely accepted, the protection of the PDA would
dwindle to only those cases in which the comparator is not disabled-which, now
that the ADA has been amended to allow more employees to qualify as disabled,
is a very small number of cases.2 3 This rule would eviscerate the PDA. As Widiss
116. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013); Reeves
v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir. 20o6); Spivey v. Beverly En-
ters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (ith Cir. 1999).
117. Widiss, supra note 7, at 1033.
18. See id.
119. However, it is still the case that employers have the right to choose which reasonable
accommodation to offer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. (2013). It is conceivable that courts
would support an employer accommodating on-the-job injuries in one way, and
other injuries in another.
120. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321 (D. Md. Feb. 14,
20n), affd, 707 F.3d 437 (4 th Cir. 2013); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 656 F. 3 d
540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011).
121. 707 F.3d at 440.
122. Id. at 448. In Serednyj, a nursing home's modified work policy provided accommo-
dations only to qualified individuals with a disability under the ADA or to employ-
ees with work-related injuries. 656 F.3d at 548. The court upheld the policy, but
discussed only the work-related injury requirement. Id. at 548-49.
123. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 1023-25; cf Cox, supra note n1, at 469-72 (contending
that the ADA should cover pregnancy per se in part because "the ADAAA's dramatic
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notes, "the fact that the ADA was amended to provide far more robust protec-
tions for disabilities generally would have the perverse effect of decreasing the
support for pregnant employees."'"
It is significant, however, that only one court has interpreted the comparator
requirement this way, perhaps because the interpretation is clearly erroneous. As
Professor Widiss explains, the plain language of the PDA's second clause obli-
gates employers to treat pregnant women the same as others "similar in their
ability or inability to work." No mention is made that individuals protected un-
der other statutes should be excluded from the realm of possible comparators for
PDA purposes."' To prevent ADA-accommodated employees from being com-
parators in a PDA claim would also result in an implied repeal of the PDA, which
is both highly disfavored as a general interpretive principle"' and expressly pro-
hibited by the ADA, which states that no part of that law "shall be construed to
invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law. . . that
provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities
than are afforded by this chapter."" 7 The only sensible interpretation is, as Widiss
puts it, "the natural reading of the PDA's plain text and a reasonable means of
harmonizing two statutes with a common purpose: increasing employment op-
portunities for employees with health conditions that impact their ability to
work."'
2. The "De Jure Comparator Theory"
Professor Widiss discusses an alternative comparator theory in her Article.' 9
She argues that making pregnancy accommodations depend on whether an indi-
vidual workplace has another employee who has been granted an accommoda-
tion makes important civil rights hinge on serendipity. Widiss argues that preg-
nant plaintiffs should be entitled to accommodations if they can prove that a
hypothetical nonpregnant worker with similar conditions would be entitled to
reasonable accommodations under the ADA or other disability-accommodation
laws. We call this the "de jure comparator theory."
increase of the number of persons entitled to workplace accommodations may in-
advertently decrease the number of pregnant women who receive them via the
PDA").
124. Widiss, supra note 7, at 1025.
125. Id. at 1025-26; see Grossman & Thomas, supra note 49, at 36, 41.
126. Widiss, supra note 7, at 1030.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2012).
128. Widiss, supra note 7, at 1031.
129. Id. at 1033-34.
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Under this theory, a court in a PDA case would be required to imagine a
fictional ADA plaintiff with the same maladies as the pregnant plaintiff, and
would try this fictional plaintiff's accommodation case under the ADA."o If the
hypothetical plaintiff would receive an accommodation, the pregnant woman
would be entitled to one as well.'3 1 Widiss argues that requiring plaintiffs to iden-
tify comparators from their own workplace results in an arbitrarily inconsistent
distribution of accommodations, depending on such factors as the size of the
workplace, the types of accommodations and disabilities common in certain lines
of work, and the timing of the plaintiff's pregnancy relative to other workers re-
quiring accommodations. If courts were to adopt this approach, pregnant
women would gain much broader protections.
The de jure comparator theory would be particularly helpful to employees in
smaller workplaces, who are likely to have a disproportionately difficult time lo-
cating a comparator, regardless of the expansion of coverage under the
ADAAA.' As of yet, however, the de jure theory has not gained a foothold in the
case law.
III. PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATION CASES AFTER THE ADAAA
Following the passage of the ADAAA, courts have begun to recognize that
conditions that are otherwise covered under the ADA are no longer disqualified
merely because they are caused by pregnancy. As this Article has explained,
whether or not a condition is related to pregnancy is irrelevant under the
amended ADA. After an initial period of uncertainty in which courts' ability to
assess the new legal environment was hampered by inadequate briefing, courts
are now on track toward understanding how to assess pregnancy accommoda-
tion cases brought under the ADA. Because we know of no PDA cases in which
plaintiffs have proven that an adverse employment action was because of sex by
pointing to the broader range of potential comparators created by the ADAAA's
expanded coverage, this Part focuses on the most significant post-ADAAA cases
decided under the impairment theory.
130. Id.
131. It is not necessary for courts that adopt a hypothetical comparator approach to ap-
ply it to cases in which the amended ADA would not require accommodation. For
example, a plaintiff would not be able to argue that, because all the other employers
on the block allow workers to come in a few minutes late, her employer must do
the same. The reason for the use of hypothetical comparators is the achievement of
uniform application of the ADA over time and among workplaces, not the creation
of a universal right of pregnancy accommodation.
132. Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small-Business Employees, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Apr. 2000, at 13.
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A. Cases That Fail to Recognize the Implications of the ADAAA
Initial pregnancy-related decisions under the ADAAA were hampered by
weak representation and by confusion on the part of some courts. The earliest
decisions seemed not to grasp the way in which the ADAAA expanded the right
to accommodation for pregnancy-related conditions.133 Indeed, the first court ap-
plied pre-2008 law without even acknowledging that Congress had changed the
statute.' 34 Other courts acknowledged passage of the ADAAA but relied on pre-
ADAAA precedent for propositions overruled by that statute.3 5
These early decisions misunderstood the new legal environment in three
basic ways. First, they ignored the demise of the duration requirement-i.e., they
asserted a condition must be permanent in order to qualify for ADA protection.36
Second, the decisions continued to embrace the narrow definitions of "substan-
tially limits" and "major life activity" that Congress (in the ADAAA) said were
inappropriate.137 Finally, the decisions invoked the pregnancy-contamination
doctrine, ignoring the ADAAA's mandate that the term disability "shall be con-
strued in favor of broad coverage."I38
In Selkow v. 7-Eleven, the Middle District of Florida did not even mention
the ADAAA in granting an employer's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiffs ADA claim.'39 The case involved a pregnant convenience store worker
who sought assistance from a co-worker with heavy lifting due to her back pain.14o
She was later fired on the basis of video evidence indicating that she had stolen
133. See Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012);
Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766 (S.D. Fla.
July 25, 2012); Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83586 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012); Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-456-T-
33, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012).
134. Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *37-42.
135. Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 210-12; Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at
*18, 25.
136. See Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 211; Mayorga, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at
*15; Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *22; Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79265, at *41-42.
137. Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d, at 210; Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *17.
138. Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 211; Mayorga, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at *12;
Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *22; Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265,
at *37; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4)(A) (2012).
139. Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *37-42.
140. Id. at *2-3.
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$10.141 She then sued, claiming she was terminated because of her pregnancy. 42
The plaintiff devoted only a small portion of her complaint to her disability
claim.'43 Unfortunately, she ignored the ADAAA and effectively conceded that
pregnancy was not a covered disability, absent unusual circumstances.' 4 Because
the plaintiff apparently overlooked the ADAAA, she also, in effect, conceded that
temporary disabilities were not covered under the ADAAA.' 5
The court appears to have adopted the parties' erroneous statements of post-
ADAAA law. Granting summary judgment to the defendant, the court held that
the plaintiffs lifting restriction did not constitute an impairment of a major life
activity, citing pre-amendment case law.14'6 The court, like the plaintiff, ignored
the statutory language providing that "lifting" is a major life activity,' 7 as well as
the ADAAA's mandate that "[t]he definition of disability. . . shall be construed
in favor of broad coverage of individuals. "14' The court also embraced the preg-
nancy-contamination doctrine, citing pre-ADAAA cases and stating that preg-
nancy-related conditions are only covered by the ADA if the pregnant woman
has "severe complications."49
Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Group, Ltd. involved a pro se plaintiff who worked
as an administrative assistant and experienced a series of medical problems fol-
lowing her return from maternity leave."'o When she was eventually terminated,
allegedly due to downsizing,' 1 she brought pregnancy discrimination claims un-
der the ADA and state law." 2
Although the Eastern District of New York acknowledged the passage of the
ADAAA, it acted as if the law did not exist. The court relied on pre-ADAAA au-
thority and asserted that "courts generally hold that complications arising from
141. Id. at *3-5.
142. Id. at *7.
143. Complaint at 8-10, Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265 (No. 8:11-cv-456-T-33).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *40.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (2012).
148. ID. § 12102(4)(A).
149. Selkow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *38-
150. Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-cv-4938, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at
*1-3 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012).
151. Id. at *5-
152. Id. at *1.
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pregnancy do not qualify as disabilities.""' "Only in extremely rare cases," it con-
tinued, are conditions related to pregnancy complications covered by the ADA.'54
This highly restrictive version of the pregnancy-contamination doctrine sharply
narrows the definition of "disability," ignoring the amended Act's mandate to
construe "disability" broadly."' The court also ignored the ADAAA regulations'
elimination of the duration requirement, stating that "temporary impair-
ments. .. are not typically considered disabilities."'56 However, in view of the fact
that the plaintiff had filed her suit pro se and had not alleged in her complaint
that any of her medical problems were linked to her pregnancy and childbirth,' 7
the court granted her leave to replead her ADA claim in order to set forth allega-
tions indicating that hers was "one of the extremely rare cases in which courts
have found that conditions that arise out of pregnancy qualify as a disability." 58
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint that survived a motion to dis-
miss. 59 In her amended complaint, the plaintiff followed the court's direction,
alleging that her disability, "chronic cholecystitis," was an illness that had been
caused by her pregnancy.16 o The defendant's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint again relied on the pre-amendment ADA's duration requirement and
its heightened standards for "substantially limits" and "major life activity.""' The
court denied this motion for reasons not reflected in the docket report,"' making
it impossible to judge the quality of the court's analysis of the plaintiffs ADA
claims. The case then settled.'
153. Id. at *22.
154. Id. at *24.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).
156. Sam-Sekur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83586, at *25.
157. Id. at *26.
158. Id. While the court's decision demonstrates a lack of familiarity with both the
ADAAA and its implementing regulations, this confusion may have been a result
of the pro se status of the plaintiff as well as the lack of any post-ADAAA precedent.
Accordingly, this case is best considered an "outlier" in the jurisprudence.
159. Order at i, Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012).
160. Amended Complaint at 3, Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012).
161. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at io,
Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012).
162. Order at 1, Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4938 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012).
163. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Sam-Sekur, No. 11-CV-4983 (E.D.N.Y. May
24, 2013).
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In Wanamaker v. Westport Board of Education, the plaintiff suffered serious
complications during childbirth, including transverse myelitis and a spinal in-
jury."6 4 In addition, her daughter was born with a serious heart defect.' The
plaintiff requested additional medical leave to address these issues, but her em-
ployer decided to replace her permanently. She sued, alleging violations of the
FMLA"' and the ADA, along with state law claims.' The District of Connecticut
dismissed (with leave to amend) the ADA claim on the grounds that, although
the plaintiff had described a pregnancy-related condition (transverse myelitis),
she had not articulated how that condition substantially limited a major life ac-
tivity.168
The court recognized that the ADAAA governed, 6 9 but cited pre-ADAAA
precedent as if the ADAAA had never been passed and again embraced the preg-
nancy-contamination doctrine as articulated in Sam-Sekur.'70 Again following
Sam-Sekur, the Wanamaker court cited pre-ADAAA cases for the proposition
that the impairments alleged could not constitute disabilities because they lacked
"proof of permanency,"' 7 ignoring the fact that the ADAAA eliminated this re-
quirement.172
The plaintiff amended her complaint, specifying that her pregnancy-related
condition "substantially interfered with major life activities, including standing
and walking, for extended periods of time, as well as bowel functions." 73 The
employer responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, in which it aban-
doned its argument that the plaintiff did not have a covered disability.74 Instead,
the employer attacked the plaintiffs cause of action for disability discrimination
by arguing that, because the plaintiffs medical impairment required her to miss
work and regular attendance is an essential function of the job, the plaintiff could
164. Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D. Conn. 2012).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 200, 209, 212.
168. Id. at 211-12.
169. Id. at 210.
170. Id. at 211.
171. Id.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (A) (2012).
173. Amended Complaint at 4, Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012) (No.
3:11-cv-0791).
174. Motion for Summary Judgment, Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012)
(No. 3:11-cv-0791).
127
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
not perform the essential functions of the job."'7 In the alternative, the employer
asserted that it had granted the plaintiff numerous leaves of absence and thus
could not be faulted for failure to engage in the interactive process. Finally, the
employer argued that the plaintiff had essentially asked for an indefinite leave of
absence or, at the very least, that the employer allow her to work a partial week
and hire another employee to cover the remaining days of the week.7' These ac-
commodations, the employer stated, constituted an undue hardship and the em-
ployer was thus under no obligation to provide them to the plaintiff.'"
In her opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff cited the ADAAA; emphasizing the legislature's intent that the term dis-
ability be construed broadly in favor of coverage."8 The plaintiff further argued
that she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than
non-disabled employees and that such comparator evidence created an inference
of discrimination on the basis of disability.'79 With respect to the interactive pro-
cess, the plaintiff asserted that it was the employer, not she, who was responsible
for engaging in a dialogue regarding possible accommodations that would allow
the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of her job."so Finally, the plaintiff
called into question the employer's articulated reason for her termination, noting
that the non-disabled person replacing the plaintiff lacked experience and, in-
deed, was relying on the teaching plans created by the plaintiff.'"' The plaintiff
concluded that a trier of fact could easily find that the employer harbored an an-
imus towards teachers who took leaves of absence.' Because the plaintiff had
been on a leave because of her disability, the plaintiff opined, a reasonable trier
of fact could find that the plaintiff was terminated because the employer believed
that the plaintiffs disability would require additional leaves of absence.' This,
the plaintiff concluded, constituted discrimination on the basis of disability.8 4
175. Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at io, Wanamaker, 899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012) (No.
3:11-cv-0791).
176. Id. at 9-10.
177. Id.
178. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 31, Wanamaker,
899 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D. Conn. 2012) (No. 3:11-cv-0791).
179. Id. at 37.
i8o. Id. at 33.
181. Id. at 35.
182. Id. at 36-37.
183. Id. at 38.
184. Id.
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At the time of this writing, the defendant's motion was pending before the
court. For our purposes, the important point is that, having started out on shaky
legs, this case is now proceeding in precisely the direction called for by the
ADAAA. That is, the focus is not on the threshold issue of whether a disability
exists, but instead on the interactive process and whether or not the plaintiffs
proposed accommodation constitutes an undue hardship. Wanamaker begins
the trend that has taken the case law in the direction of a firmer command of the
relevant law post-ADAAA.
This trend continued with McKellips v. Franciscan Health System,"' which
involved a plaintiff who experienced "immobilizing pain in her pelvis" as a com-
plication of pregnancy."' The plaintiffs doctor recommended that she take ma-
ternity leave two months early and get accommodations at work. In response, the
plaintiff asked her employer for a parking spot closer to her workplace in order
to reduce her walking distance. Her supervisor denied this request, allegedly
commenting that "pain is a part of every pregnancy" and advising plaintiff that
if she had suggestions about changes at work, to "put them in the suggestion
box.""' The plaintiff was fired approximately five days before her maternity leave
was scheduled to begin. 8 8
Again, in this case, there are problems with the plaintiffs complaint, which
initially failed to include an ADA claim.' When the plaintiff sought to add a
claim for violation of the ADA, the defendant opposed her motion to amend,
arguing that the ADA excludes pregnancy from its definition of disability and
therefore amendment would be futile.'9 o The plaintiff argued that her pregnancy-
related pelvic pain substantially limited her in the major life activity of walking
and thus potentially was an ADA disability.'9'
The court allowed the plaintiff to amend, holding that "defendant has failed
to prove Plaintiffs claim under the ADA is futile."'92 The court's holding was
consistent with the ADAAA. Yet the underlying reasoning of the court does not
show a full command of post-ADAAA law. The court did not cite either to the
language of the ADAAA or to the EEOC's implementing regulations. Instead, it
cited pre-ADAAA case law, reciting the out-of-date proposition that pregnancy
185. No. 3:13-CV-05096, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68069 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2013).
186. Id. at *2.
187. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Damages at 5, McKellips, No. 3:13-CV-
05096 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2013).
188. McKellips, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68069, at *2.
189. Id. at *8.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *1o.
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is not a disability "absent unusual circumstances."'9 3 Happily, in this particular
case McKellips's condition was unusual, yet the court's language could be mis-
leading in cases that involve pregnancy conditions more common than the one
encountered by McKellips. Pregnancy-related conditions can qualify as impair-
ments if they interfere with a major bodily system or life activity-regardless of
whether or not the pregnancy condition is "unusual." Nonetheless, McKellips
clearly signals that pregnancy-related conditions can be disabilities under the
ADA. After the plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint, it appears that the
case settled.
B. Cases That Recognize the Relevant Revisions of the ADAAA
More recent decisions show that courts and plaintiffs are increasingly famil-
iar with the expanded coverage of the ADAAA. 94 While these courts have not
always been presented with well-pled complaints or good fact patterns, they have,
to varying degrees, correctly interpreted the law. In each of the following five
cases, the courts adopted a mode of reasoning consistent with the idea that the
intent of the ADAAA was to make it easier for plaintiffs to establish their status
as disabled. These courts did not use the pregnancy-contamination doctrine as a
per se bar to establishing disability. Rather than relying on pre-ADAAA case law,
the courts looked to the ADAAA and its implementing regulations, which make
clear that the duration of a condition does not determine whether the Act applies.
These five courts also rejected the defendants' argument that the pregnancy-re-
lated conditions at issue were not sufficiently severe or unusual enough to "sub-
stantially limit" a "major life activity." Instead, they relied on language in both
the statute and the implementing regulations wherein lifting is explicitly refer-
enced as an example of a major life activity.
In Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., the plaintiff had a high-risk pregnancy with com-
plications including "premature uterine contractions, irritation of the uterus, in-
creased heart rate, severe morning sickness, severe pelvic bone pains, severe back
pain, severe lower abdominal pain, extreme headaches, and other pregnancy-re-
lated conditions."'9 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claims
for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA, assert-
ing that the plaintiff did not have a disability within the meaning of the Act.9' In
193. Id.
194. See Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., No. ii C 8480, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1oo965 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013); Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No.
1:12-cv-o817, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3273 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013); Mayorga v. Alorica,
Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2012).
195. Mayorga, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103766, at *3-
196. Id. at *5.
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support of this argument, the defendant relied on both the pregnancy-contami-
nation doctrine and the pre-ADAAA duration requirement.'97
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court liberally cited pre-
ADAAA law. At the same time, the court acknowledged the impact of the
"ADAAA's lenient standards to establish a disability" and purported to analyze
the plaintiff s complaint with this principle in mind.'9' The court held that a preg-
nancy-related condition could qualify as a disability if the condition caused an
impairment "separate from the symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy"
or if the condition "significantly" intensified the symptoms associated with a
healthy pregnancy, eschewing language to the effect that such conditions are cov-
ered under the ADA only in "extremely rare" cases.'99 The court refused to dis-
miss the plaintiffs disability claim, finding that "whether the nature, duration,
and severity of [the plaintiffs pregnancy-related conditions] are sufficient to
constitute a disability under the ADA" required a factual inquiry. 00 The case ul-
timately settled.21'
The court in Nayak v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc. appro-
priately distinguished pre-amendment case law. It relied instead on the interpret-
ing regulations of the ADAAA, which state that "an impairment lasting or ex-
pected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting."20 2 Nayak
involved a plaintiff who had experienced morning sickness and required bed rest
during her pregnancy with twins.2 3 While on bed rest, one of her two unborn
fetuses died. 20 4 Subsequent to the birth of her child, the plaintiff had postpartum
difficulties including severe pelvic pain.20 5 Her employer, by his own admission,
terminated the plaintiff because of her "medically complicated pregnancy. "206
The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for disability
discrimination, arguing that the plaintiffs pregnancy-related conditions did not,
as a matter of law, constitute a protected disability because they were tempo-
rary.20 7 The cases cited by the defendant included two pre-ADAAA cases and
197. Id. at *15-
198. Id.
199. Id. at *14.
200. Id. at *23-
201. Notice of Settlement, Mayorga, No. 1:12-cV-21578 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2012).
202. Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., No. 1:12-cv-o817, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3273, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013).
203. Id. at *2.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *3.
207. Id. at *5-6.
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Sam-Sekur.o' The court distinguished Sam-Sekuro 9 and found the pre-ADAAA
cases unpersuasive in light of the "more lenient" standards of the ADAAA and
"the current change in the law stating that an impairment lasting less than six
months can be substantially limiting."2"o The court also cited the interpreting reg-
ulations of the ADAAA providing that "[tihe term 'substantially limits' shall be
construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.'" ". This case is ongoing.
In Price v. UTi Integrated Logistics, LLC, 2 the plaintiff had a blood disorder
that resulted in a history of high-risk pregnancies and four miscarriages.213 In the
sixth month of her pregnancy, her doctor diagnosed her with an open cervix and
advised immediate bed rest to ward off another miscarriage. 14 The plaintiff al-
leged that, upon learning of Price's need for a leave of absence, her supervisor
told her, "Your job will be held." 2 15 Price nonetheless was fired after her employer
ordered her back to work earlier than her doctor had authorized because, her
employer alleged, Price's FMLA leave had expired."'
The court refused to grant summary judgment to the defendant, who cited
pre-ADAAA case law to support the argument that the plaintiff did not have an
ADA claim because pregnancy typically is not an impairment. 17 Even if the plain-
tiffs pregnancy was an impairment, the employer argued, the plaintiffs condi-
tion was temporary in that it would not continue past delivery."' Not surpris-
ingly, the court did not accept this argument. Properly citing the ADAAA
language that the definition of disability should be broadly construed in favor of
expansive coverage, the court held that the "plaintiff was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA because there is evidence that [she] suffered multiple phys-
iological disorders and conditions that affected her reproductive system.""9 In
208. Id. at *6-7.
209. Id. at *7.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *6.
212. Price v. UTi Integrated Logistics, LLC, No. 4:11-cv-01428, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142974 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2013); Complaint at 8, Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974
(No. 4:11-cv-01428 ).
213. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974 (No. 4:11-cv-01428 ).
214. Complaint at 4, Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974 (No. 4:11-cv-01428).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974 (No. 4:11-cv-01428).
218. Id.
219. Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974, at *7.
132
32:97 2013
A SIP OF COOL WATER
reaching this conclusion, the court also refused to accept the defendant's dura-
tion argument, properly citing EEOC regulations that a condition that is episodic
can be a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity when active.22 o After
the defendant lost its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff won a jury trial
based on her state law gender, pregnancy and disability claim, but not her ADA
claim."'
In Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., the plaintiff, who worked at a fast
food restaurant, was placed on "light duty" by her doctor after she got preg-
nant." Her doctor later restricted her to bed rest." When the plaintiff exhausted
her leave and failed to notify her employer that she needed additional leave, she
was terminated for violating the employer's attendance policy.2 * Following her
termination, she filed a complaint that included causes of action for disability
discrimination and failure to accommodate.2 5 She alleged that she was termi-
nated due to a pregnancy-related condition,"' and that her employer had failed
to accommodate her by forcing her to work outside periodically.2 2 7
With respect to the plaintiffs claim for disability discrimination, the court
assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie
case. 8 Yet, because the plaintiff had failed to offer any factual or legal argument
for why the defendant's non-discriminatory explanation for her termination (vi-
olation of its attendance policy) was pretextual, the court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment." 9
The court next considered the plaintiffs claim that Portillo's failed to pro-
vide her with a reasonable accommodation for her qualifying disability.23 o To
establish that she had a disability, the plaintiff asserted that "her high-risk preg-
nancy and/or the complications she suffered related to her pregnancy" were im-
pairments that substantially limited the major life activity of lifting.3 In support
220. Id.
221. Judgment, Price, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142974 (No. 4:11-cy-01428).
222. Heatherly v. Portillo's Hot Dogs, Inc., No. ni C 8480, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1oo965,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013).
223. Id.
224. Id. at *3-
225. Id. at *3-4, 10.
226. Id. at *io.
227. Id. at *18.
228. Id. at *12.
229. Id. at *12-13.
230. Id. at *13-14.
231. Id. at *14-15-
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of this argument, the plaintiff pointed out that the ADAAA had "relaxed the du-
ration and severity requirements" for qualified disabilities and that the ADAAA's
implementing regulations expressly stated that an impairment lasting fewer than
six months could be substantially limiting. 32 The defendant countered that tem-
porary restrictions could not, as a matter of law, substantially limit a major life
activity.233
The court summarily dismissed the defendant's argument in light of the
ADAAA's elimination of the duration requirement.2 34 Similarly, the court found
unpersuasive the defendant's argument that lifting restrictions did not constitute
a major life activity." As the court correctly noted, the plain language of the
ADAAA defines lifting as a major life activity.236 Because the plaintiff's nurse had
testified that limiting the plaintiff to light duty included lifting restrictions, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had "presented evidence sufficient to create a
triable issue of fact as to whether her high risk pregnancy rendered her disabled
under the ADAAA."31 Nonetheless, the court granted summary judgment on this
claim as well, finding that the record was "replete with evidence" suggesting the
plaintiffs condition did not affect her ability to work outside.23' The most damn-
ing evidence came from the plaintiffs treating physician and nurse, who testified
that there was no medical reason the plaintiff could not work outside.239 In
Heatherly, the court correctly applied the ADAAA to the facts before it. Ulti-
mately the facts presented to the court simply did not support the plaintiffs
claims.
While still in its infancy, the case law shows a trend towards a greater under-
standing of the fact that the ADA covers pregnancy-related conditions after the
ADAAA.2 40 However, given the misstatements of law in the first several ADAAA
232. Id.
233. Id. at *15.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *15-16.
238. Id. at *19-20.
239. Id at *19.
240. Some of the early confusion may have stemmed from the failure of LEXIS-NEXIS,
Westlaw and other such services to warn lawyers that many ADA cases are no longer
valid precedent after the ADAAA. Clerks inexperienced in employment law may
well have cited pre-ADAAA cases without realizing that their validity had been se-
verely undermined by statute. Happily, understanding of the post-amendments
ADA appears to be increasing. Even so, Westlaw, LEXIS-NEXIS and other such ser-
vices should consider flagging pre-ADAAA cases that rely on elements of the pre-
20o8 ADA that are no longer good law.
134
32:97 2013
A SIP OF COOL WATER
cases, practitioners and plaintiffs litigating this issue should carefully guide the
courts through the meaning and intent of the ADAAA. In briefing pregnancy
cases arguing the impairment theory, plaintiffs should include the arguments ad-
vanced in this Article, including: (I) the demise of the duration requirement fol-
lowing passage the ADAAA; (2) the more expansive definition of "major life ac-
tivities" mandated by the ADAAA; (3) the easing of the "substantially limits"
standard under the ADAAA; and (4) that the pregnancy-contamination doctrine
is inconsistent with the ADAAA's mandate of broad coverage.24
Advocating the first three arguments should require little more than citing
to the plain language of the ADAAA and its implementing regulations. The preg-
nancy-contamination doctrine is more complicated. The simple argument is that
it constitutes precisely the kind of high hurdle that courts imposed before the
ADAAA, and that the statute was designed to correct. To the extent that the preg-
nancy-contamination doctrine is rooted in unconscious bias and outmoded be-
liefs regarding women and pregnancy, plaintiffs should consider analogizing
their pregnancy-related conditions to parallel conditions that are not the result
of pregnancy.
The Appendix is designed to help in this process. It provides medical condi-
tions that produce symptoms similar to those produced by pregnancy. Such in-
formation can help plaintiffs who seek to establish that what matters for ADA
purposes is whether a condition constitutes an impairment, regardless of whether
or not it was caused by pregnancy or by another medical condition. When fram-
ing their pregnancy-related impairments, plaintiffs should be sure to describe the
condition using appropriate medical terminology. Referring to an impairment
by its medical name deemphasizes the fact that the condition stems from preg-
nancy.
Finally, plaintiffs should be sure to distinguish pre-ADAAA case law, point-
ing out that the holdings in those cases now have been overruled by statute. Sim-
ilarly, plaintiffs should liberally cite post-ADAAA cases (such as Heatherly) in
which the court correctly applies current law.
IV. SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE IMPAIRMENT AND COMPARATOR THEORIES
A. The Relative Benefits of Filing a Claim under the ADA and PDA
While most women would prefer having a job over being a plaintiff in a dis-
ability or pregnancy discrimination lawsuit, a woman who is unable to work be-
cause her employer failed to accommodate her pregnancy-related impairments
may have no other option but to pursue legal action. Her claim may be based on
the ADA, in which case her argument will center on the impairment theory, or
the PDA, in which case her argument may have to center on the comparator the-
ory. This Part addresses the relative merits of each.
241. The mandate for broad coverage is in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (A) (2012).
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A PDA claim may require the plaintiff to produce nonpregnant comparators
in order to prove pregnancy discrimination, either because the plaintiff has no
other evidence or because she has filed her claim in one of the circuits requiring
comparator evidence as a matter of law. In those courts that require a pregnant
plaintiff to find a suitable nonpregnant comparator, plaintiffs often will be unable
to do so if those courts insist on de facto rather than de jure comparators. More-
over, commentators have extensively documented that many courts make it ex-
tremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases through comparators.4' They
do so by insisting on a comparator who is a "near twin"243: whose characteristics
and circumstances are virtually identical to those of the plaintiff. Indeed, one
commentator has argued that some courts' comparator analysis comes close to
eviscerating Title VII by rejecting virtually all comparators except those who are
identical to the plaintiff in essentially every way.4 As discussed above, this chal-
lenge could be exacerbated by the possibility that the reasoning of cases like
Young and Serednyj will be followed, and only workers who are not disabled un-
der the ADA will be deemed proper comparators for women with pregnancy-
related impairments.
An ADA claim applying the impairment theory avoids the comparator prob-
lem, but has its own limits. While the statute's scope of coverage is broad, it does
not require accommodations for all situations in which pregnant women might
want an accommodation. Some situations in which pregnant women commonly
request workplace accommodations-such as when a policewoman wants to be
taken off the beat and given desk work for fear that she might be hit hard in the
womb during a scuffle or when a woman wants an accommodation to limit her
fetus's exposure to toxics - involve not a current impairment to the mother but
prospective injury to the fetus. 4 5 In these cases, the ADA does not apply because
no impairment exists. At the same time, if the mother becomes extremely anxious
about the potential for harm to the fetus due to toxics or another reason, her
anxiety may be a disability under the ADA.4
242. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 755; Lidge, supra note 39, at 849-50; Sullivan, supra
note 41, at 204.
243. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 1661.
244. Goldberg, supra note 41, at 763-64.
245. See Int'l. Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Amerson v. Pinkerton Sec.
& Serys., No. 05-706n1, 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38671 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2006); Pa-
trice Sutton et al., Toxic Environmental Chemicals: The Role of Reproductive Health
Professionals in Preventing Harmful Exposures, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 164 (2012) (describing how fetuses are more susceptible to toxic ex-
posure than are adults).
246. See Complaint at 5-6, EEOC v. Engineering Documentation Sys., Inc., No.3:11-cv-
00707 (D. Nev. 2011). In that case, an administrative assistant with a government
support services contractor requested to move her workstation closer to the re-
stroom as an accommodation for her severe nausea. Her employer refused, and
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These examples represent instances in which the PDA and the comparator
theory may offer protection not available under the ADA. If the pregnant woman
can point to a similarly situated coworker who has been voluntarily accommo-
dated by her employer-for instance, where other police are regularly taken off
the beat and given deskwork for a wide variety of reasons, or where a co-worker
has been allowed to avoid toxics exposure because her skin breaks out in an un-
attractive but harmless rash-then she may have a viable claim for pregnancy
discrimination if she is not granted the same right. That is, a pregnant woman
who can point to a comparator who has been accommodated should be given
similar treatment even where the ADA does not mandate such accommodations.
B. The Theories in Action: Specific Medical Conditions
Throughout this Article, we have sought to emphasize the similarities be-
tween medical conditions experienced during pregnancy and non-pregnancy-re-
lated conditions with comparable symptoms. This Section and the accompanying
Appendix present concrete examples of some such conditions. While we cannot
hope to cover every pregnancy-related condition, our goal is to further support
the proposition that a particular condition's basis in pregnancy should be irrele-
vant to an accommodation analysis following the recent amendments to the
ADA.
Gestational diabetes, for example, qualifies as a disability under the ADAAA
because it is an impairment that substantially limits the operation of a major bod-
ily function, i.e., the endocrine function. 47 The EEOC has explicitly stated that
gestational diabetes may be a disability.4' In terms of accommodation needs,
there should be no difference between a woman with gestational diabetes and a
coworker with type 2 diabetes, as both may need breaks for insulin and to test
blood sugar, and both may need to eat small meals over the course of the day.
Hyperemesis gravidarum-the nausea and vomiting that often occurs in the
first trimester and sometimes extends throughout the pregnancy-can substan-
tially limit the operation of the digestive function.4 9 Thus, just as a nonpregnant
employee was found to be disabled where she has gastrointestinal problems-
allegedly later required her to become certified in handling explosives and ammu-
nition, which caused her to become very anxious. The case, which also involved
PDA claims, was settled for $70,000. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, EDSI to Pay $70,000 to Settle EEOC Pregnancy & Disability Discrimina-
tion Suit (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-15-13.cfm.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 163 o.2(i)(1)(ii) (2013).
248. See Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/pregnancy.cfm (last visited June 20, 2013).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(b).
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causing pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea that lasted for about a year 250 -so
should a pregnant employee with morning sickness. Both may need more fre-
quent bathroom breaks, the ability to eat small snacks during work hours, access
to a cot for lying down, and a modified schedule.2"' These accommodations are
also frequently required for diabetes. 25 2
Perinatal depression, which includes both major and minor depressive dis-
orders that occur during pregnancy or after giving birth,5 should be accommo-
dated just as is any other type of depression. Such accommodations may include
time off for an initial meeting with a physician immediately after the onset of
symptoms; schedule flexibility that allows the employee to participate in thera-
peutic sessions; temporary transfer to a less distracting environment; telecom-
muting; and leave. 54 All types of depression may substantially limit the operation
of a major bodily function (the brain), or may substantially limit major life ac-
tivities (thinking, sleeping, concentrating, caring for oneself, and interacting with
others).s5 The EEOC lists major depression as a condition that virtually always
qualifies as a disability.256
250. See Wells v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 86o F. Supp. 2d 469, 476, 478
(S.D. Ohio 2012).
251. Cf Complaint at 3-4, Roller v. Nat'l Processing of Am., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02746 (D.
Kan. Nov. 28, 2012).
252. Interview with Rebecca Jackson, Dir., Dep't of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reprod.
Sci. at S.F. Gen. Hosp., in S.F., Cal. (Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with authors).
253. According to a 2007 study, "14.5 percent of pregnant women have a new episode of
major or minor depression during pregnancy and 14.5 percent have a new episode
during the first 3 months postpartum. Considering only major depression, 7.5 per-
cent may have a new episode during pregnancy, with 6.5 percent having a new epi-
sode in the first 3 months postpartum." BRADLEY N. GAYNES ET AL., PERINATAL
DEPRESSION: PREVALENCE, SCREENING ACCURACY, AND SCREENING OUTCOMES 4
(2005), available at http://archive.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/peridepsum.pdf.
254. Post-Partum Depression: Treatment and Drugs, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayo-
clinic.com/health/postpartum-depression/DSoo546/DSECTION=treatments-and-
drugs (last visited Dec. 3, 2012); see Memorandum from the Att'y Gen. of the U.S.
Dep't. of Justice to Heads of Dep'ts on Procedures for Providing Reasonable Ac-
commodation (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/eeos/
ddaccomprocfinalo81502.htm; The HR Specialist, The ADA Requirements for Ac-
commodating Depression and Psychiatric Disabilities, Bus. MGMT. DAILY (Jan. 7,
20o8), http://www.businessmanagementdaily.com/4179/the-ada-requirements-for
-accommodating-depression-and-psychiatric-disabilities.
255. The HR Specialist, supra note 254; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B) (2012); 29
C.F.R. § 163 o.2(i)(1)(i)-(ii) (2011).
256. 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(j)( 3 ).
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CONCLUSION
Pregnant women frequently lose their jobs when their employers fail to pro-
vide the kinds of accommodations that would allow them to continue working.
The ADAAA has changed the law in ways that require employers to offer such
(often modest) accommodations, a conclusion supported by important voices
among employers' lawyers.5 7 Given that the EEOC has cited pregnancy accom-
modation as an important emerging issue, employers' lawyers would be well ad-
vised to begin training clients to ensure that they understand the new legal envi-
ronment."' Additional EEOC Guidance on pregnancy accommodation would
help clarify any remaining confusion. In today's post-ADAAA legal environ-
ment, much has changed. Perhaps the clearest way to communicate this is to
close with a discussion of the oft-cited case of Troupe v. May Department Stores,
a Seventh Circuit decision written by Judge Richard Posner.5 9 Kimberly Troupe,
who worked at Lord & Taylor, had a satisfactory performance record until she
got pregnant and began having repeated attendance problems as a result of severe
morning sickness.260 The store gave her an accommodation-it allowed her to
start work later-that did not solve the problem. 6 ' Troupe continued to be late
and was fired the day before her maternity leave was to begin because, her super-
visor told her, Lord & Taylor did not believe that Troupe would return to work
after having her baby."'
The key problem in Troupe was that Lord & Taylor presented no evidence
whatsoever"' at summary judgment to rebut Troupe's evidence of gender stere-
otyping-the stereotype that women lose their work commitment after they have
children. 6 4 Yet in ruling on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
district court refused to consider this evidence, believing it inapplicable to its
analysis."' Judge Posner upheld the trial court's dismissal,' a ruling in keeping
257. See Margaret Hart Edwards & Joan C. Williams, Not for Women Only: Recognizing
and Preventing Family Responsibilities Discrimination (Nov. 1, 2012)(ABA Labor
& Employment Law Conference Paper).
258. See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN
(2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm.
259. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
260. Id. at 735.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 736.
263. We are assuming that if Lord & Taylor had presented this evidence, Judge Posner
would have discussed it in his opinion.
264. See Correll, supra note 24, at 1305-07.
265. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
266. Id. at 739.
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with his publicly stated view that it is unfair to require employers to "subsidize"
women, who are more expensive to employ because they get pregnant."'
Troupe is a 1994 case, decided before social scientists had begun to document
the gender bias triggered by pregnancy and motherhood. 6 ' Today, Troupe's tes-
timony that her supervisor told Troupe "I ... was going to be terminated because
[my supervisor] didn't think I was coming back to work after I had my baby""29
would be recognized as evidence of maternal-wall bias-the strongest form of
workplace gender bias. Such evidence, if believed by a reasonable trier of fact,
would be sufficient to support a conclusion that Troupe was fired because of
sex.2 70
Moreover, Troupe's severe nausea would qualify as disability, since it is an
impairment of a major bodily system (the gastrointestinal system). 7' If Troupe
were litigating her case today, she would file a claim for disability discrimination
under the ADA in addition to her claim under the PDA. Would Lord & Taylor's
conduct, then, have been actionable disability discrimination?
It depends. The key issue today would not be whether Troupe could find a
comparator 72 or whether she had a disability. Instead, the key issue would be
whether reasonably accommodating Troupe would be an undue hardship for
Lord & Taylor. A strong argument could be made that it would be undue hard-
ship for an employer operating a department store to have a member of its sales
staff arriving persistently late, but ultimately the answer to the question of
whether this was an undue hardship would depend on facts we do not know.
Given that Troupe's need for this accommodation was time-limited, transferring
Troupe to a different position (if available) or providing Troupe with a finite
leave of absence may have been reasonable.
267. See Posner, supra note 29, at 195.
268. The term "maternal wall" was coined in 2001, which is also when the first studies
were published. See Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Biernat, The Mater-
nal Wall, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 675 (2004).
269. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe(k) (2012); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment
of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISsION (May 23, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html.
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
272. Judge Posner upheld the grant of summary judgment on the grounds that Troupe
had not identified "a hypothetical Mr. Troupe" to serve as a comparator. Troupe,
20 F.3d at 738. As noted in the text, there was other evidence of gender bias; a court
cannot dismiss a plaintiff's case on the grounds that the plaintiff has not presented
the particular type of evidence a judge prefers. The judge's job is to apply the legal
test, which in this situation is whether the plaintiff has proved that a negative em-
ployment action is because of sex.
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In short, in the current legal environment, pregnant workers will not always
be entitled to accommodation. The fact that pregnant women are not, as a matter
of law, entitled to accommodation for any and all impairments related to preg-
nancy is not the end of the analysis, however. While pregnancy is clearly not a
disability per se, when a pregnant worker experiences a medical condition or dis-
ease that qualifies as a disability under the ADA, ADA protections are triggered-
just as they would be if the etiology of the disease or condition was anything other
than pregnancy. Pregnant workers should be treated like other workers with a
similar ability or inability to work. 73 That means they share in the job protections
offered to every worker by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k).
141
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
APPENDIX
Some Pregnancy Conditions That Commonly Give Rise to
the Need for Workplace Accommodations*
UNDER- DESCRIPTION OTHER BODILY REASONABLE
LYING MEDICAL FUNCTION ACCOMMO-
CONDI- CONDITIONS AFFECTED 27 4  DATIONS2 7 5
TIONS THAT CAN
PRODUCE
SIMILAR
SYMPTOMS
Sub-chorionic Uterine or vaginal Menstrual Reproductive Time off for
hematoma; bleeding in pregnancy dysfunction medical
placental is a symptom usually (endometrial appointments;
abruption; caused by problems hyperplasia; bedrest; move
placentia with placental anovulation); workstation
previa attachment that can uterine fibroid;, close to
result in several von Willebrand restrooms
pregnancy conditions disease; liver,
that put women at risk kidney, or
for preterm delivery or thyroid disease;
miscarriage. cancerns6
Lumbar Pregnant women Back injury; Musculoskeletal Use of a
lordosis experience back pain degenerative heating pad;
through a variety of joint disease; sitting instead
mechanisms, scoliosis; of standing;
including the sway- arthritis lifting
backed posture muscular assistance or
(lumbar lordosis) dystrophy and limitations;
caused by a growing kidney using assistive
belly and the infection or equipment to
hormones of stones lift;
pregnancy loosening modification
up the joints, muscle of the duties of
spasms and "Braxton- the job, such as
Hicks" contractions. temporary
Pregnancy may also light duty
exacerbate pre-existing
* Prepared with the assistance of Drs. Marya Zlatnik and Megan Huchko (University
of California at San Francisco) of the Center for WorkLife Law's Pregnancy
Accommodation Working Group.
274. Both the ADA and its implementing regulations provide a list of some major bodily
functions that are major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2012); 29 C.F.R.
§ 163 0.2(i) (2013).
275. This section merely provides samples of possible accommodations; the appropriate
accommodation in each case will vary depending upon the woman's condition and
her job. Another excellent source of suggested accommodations is the Job Accom-
modation Network, http://www.askjan.org.
276. Blood Disorders in Women-Heavy Menstrual Bleeding, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/blooddisorders/women/menorrhagia
.html (last visited December 15, 2013).
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back problems. Back
pain, if severe, can
interfere with major
life activities (standing,
reaching, lifting, or
bending).
Deep vein Pregnancy increases Immobility; Cardiovascular Modification
thrombosis; women's risk for trauma of work
pulmonary blood clots, which can including station; breaks
embolism; occur in the veins of broken bones; for exercise
stroke the legs (deep vein severe muscle
thrombosis), lungs injury;
(pulmonary paralysis;
embolism) or brain hormone
(stroke). replacement
therapy; heart
disease;
cancer',
Carpal Tunnel Tingling, pain, Also common Musculoskeletal; Occasional
Syndrome numbness and joint in nonpregnant neurological breaks from
stiffness in hands and people who do manual tasks
wrists is common in repetitive small or typing;
late pregnancy due to motions with specialized
changes in fluid hands/wrists programs that
composition and (i.e. typing) or allow for
increased amount of after forearm/ dictation
pressure on median wrist injury instead of
nerve in wrist."'8 typing
Carpal tunnel
syndrome is an
impairment that is
much more prevalent
in pregnant women
than the population
generally.79
Chronic A condition Menstrual or Neurological Changing
migraines sometimes idiopathic lighting in the
exacerbated by migraines; work area;
pregnancy that can be other forms of limiting
a disability when the chronic exposure to
headaches reach headache noise and
substantially limiting including post- fragrances;
levels. Migraines can concussion scheduling
limit major life syndrome; changes such
activities such as tension-type as flexible
277. Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT)/Pulmonary Embolism (PE), CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/dvt/facts.html (last updated
Sept. 25, 2012).
278. One court interpreting the ADAAA has already held that an employee's carpal tun-
nel syndrome, which impaired his ability to type for more than an hour, combined
with several emotional disorders, including anxiety related to his slow typing, cre-
ated a question of material fact as to his actual disability. Dentice v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., No. 10-113, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89609, at *7, *32-34 (E.D. Wis. June 28,
2012).
279. See supra note 109.
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seeing, hearing, eating, headache;' schedules or
sleeping, walking, acute headaches telework
learning, reading, including acute (which may
concentrating, glaucoma; include a
thinking, encephalitis transfer to a
communicating, and position that
working. provides this
kind of
flexibility)
Dependent Swelling, especially of Kidney disease/ Cardiovascular Stool or chair
edema feet/ankles, is more failure; heart to sit on while
common as pregnancy failure; working; more
progresses, and cirrhosis of the frequent rest
becomes worse with liver breaks;
standing. This is modification
caused by an increase of footwear
in the overall volume requirements
of fluid in the body,
leading to a decrease
in protein
concentration or
oncotic pressure
within the circulatory
system. This leads to
fluid extravasation
from blood vessels
into the extravascular
space.
Dyspnea Shortness of breath is Hyperventila- Respiratory Stool or chair
common due to the tion syndrome/ to sit on while
partially compensated panic attacks; working; more
respiratory alkalosis of asthma; frequent rest
pregnancy. A pregnant emphysema; breaks
women breathes more chronic
deeply to allow gas bronchitis;
exchange for herself, cardiovascular
the placenta, and the disease; or
fetus. Breathing more pulmonary
deeply (increasing embolism
"minute ventilation")
increases the pH of her
blood (makes it a little
more basic). Her
kidneys partially
compensate by putting
more bicarbonate into
her urine. This
physiology is what
makes daily life
difficult for pregnant
women.
Fatigue A feeling of tiredness Anemia; Neurological; Light duty to
or exhaustion or a congestive cardiovascular avoid
need to rest because of heart failure; strenuous
lack of energy or lyme disease; activity;
strength. cancer flexible or
280. Benjamin Gilmore & Magdalena Michael, Treatment of Acute Migraine Headache,
83 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 271, 273 tbl.2 (2011), http://www.aafp.org/afpl201/0201
/p271.pdf.
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reduced hours;
exemption
from
mandatory
overtime
Gastroesopha- Mild to severe Also seen in Digestive Allowing food
geal reflux heartburn is common nonpregnant breaks as
(GERD) in pregnancy, caused patients needed;
by hormones providing
loosening muscle that space for
is supposed to hold medications to
stomach contents be stored
down.
Gestational This is a condition in Diabetes Endocrine Permission to
diabetes which the placenta take more
interferes with the frequent
body's normal bathroom
metabolism of glucose. breaks;
Women with permission to
gestational diabetes eat small
need to monitor their snacks during
blood glucose two to work hours; a
six times per day, and cot for lying
some may need to take down;
insulin or oral modified
medication to control schedules"
blood glucose levels.
The resulting high
blood glucose levels
can cause placental
dysfunction, increased
fetal growth and post-
natal metabolic
abnormalities.
Complications of
uncontrolled
gestational diabetes
include fetal
macrosomia, shoulder
dystocia, and increased
need for cesarean
section.
Hemorrhoids Pregnancy can cause Also common Cardiovascular Allowing
swelling of rectal veins in nonpregnant women to
due to hormonal people avoid being in
changes, constipation a seated
(more common in position all day
pregnancy), and or to use a
increased pelvic girth/ special cushion
pressure.
Hemorrhoids can be
painful or even bleed.
Hyperemesis Pregnant women can Chemotherapy Digestive Permission to
gravidarum have nausea and/or for cancer; take more
vomiting that limits hepatitis; frequent
their ability to work in vestibulitis; a bathroom
certain settings/certain variety of GI breaks;
times of day. Severe disorders permission to
281. Interview with Rebecca Jackson, supra note 252.
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nausea and vomiting (gastroparesis, eat small
in pregnancy can dyspepsia, snacks during
result in weight loss, inflammatory work hours; a
dehydration, and/or bowel disease) cot for lying
electrolyte imbalance. down;
It occurs most modified
commonly in the first schedules
trimester but can
extend throughout the
entire pregnancy and
all day long.
Hypertension; Chronic or pregnancy- Hypertension Cardiovascular Stool or chair
preeclampsia induced high blood for employee
pressure may endanger to sit on while
both the health of the working;
mother and the fetus. limiting lifting
Pregnancy outcomes and bending
range from poor fetal requirements;
growth, fetal distress allowing work
and intrauterine from home
demise. The mother while on
may experience bedrest and
damage to her kidneys, leave
liver, heart and brain
(seizure or stroke).
Major life activities
impacted include
performing manual
tasks, walking,
standing, lifting,
bending, and
workingwoi
Intrauterine Condition in which Reproductive Bedrest; time
Growth the aetus is not off for medical
Restriction growing appropriately appointments
inside the uterus.
There are multiple
causes for this,
including congenital
anomalies, infection in
pregnancy, placental
attachment disorders,
multiple gestation and
maternal medical
conditions. A related
condition is low
amniotic fluid or
oligohydrannios.
Complications include
fetal distress, need for
early delivery and
increased need for
cesarean section.
Intrauterine Multiple gestation See sections Reproductive See sections
fetal growth (twins, triplets, pertaining to pertaining to
restriction; quadruplets or more) related related
oligohydra- puts women at risk for conditions, conditions,
icnios; risk of many pregnancy infra. infra.
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i)(1)(i)-(ii) (2013).
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preterm labor;
preeclampsia;
gestational
diabetes
Perinatal
depression
Preterm labor
risk
complications.
Women may go into
labor or have an
indicated early
delivery and have an
increased risk for
cesarean section.
Providers may
recommend fetal
monitoring in the
third trimester.
Includes both major
and minor depressive
disorders that occur
during pregnancy or
after giving birth.
Symptoms include
inability to sleep, loss
of focus, feelings of
helplessness, and
thoughts of suicide.
Depression may
substantially limit
major life activities
(thinking, sleeping,
concentrating, caring
for oneself, and
interacting with
others)."3
Pregnant women may
develop symptoms
that put them at risk
for pre-term labor and
delivery, including
contractions,
shortened cervix,
advanced cervical
dilation early in
pregnancy, abnormal
vaginal bleeding or
preterm premature
rupture of
membranes. In
addition to medical
management,
recommendations for
women at risk range
from modified or
complete bedrest to
inpatient
management.
Depression
See sections
pertaining to
related
conditions,
infra.
Neurological
Reproductive
Time off to
attend
therapeutic
sessions;
temporary
transfer to a
less distracting
environment;
telecommuting
and leave
See sections
pertaining to
related
conditions,
infra.
Symphyseal Loosening of the joint Bladder Musculoskeletal Limits on
separation on the front of the extrophy; lifting
(i.e., pubic pelvic bone (pubic injury (pelvic requirements;
symphysis symphysis) in fracture) providing a
separation) preparation for stool or chair
childbirth is caused by to sit on; more
pregnancy hormones.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i)(1)(i)-(ii).
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This condition can
result in severe pelvic
pain and limited
mobility like with
some back problems.
frequent
breaks
Syncope or Feeling lightheaded or Cardiac Cardiovascular Providing a
near-syncope dizzy (or fainting) is arrhythmias; stool or chair
common in pregnancy low blood to sit on; more
due to the increase in pressure; frequent
proportion of blood seizure breaks
volume going to the disorders;
uterus and fetus. neurocardio-
Symptoms can be genic or
caused by heat, stress vasovagal
or unusual exertion. syncope, also
The patient may also known as "the
experience vapors"
palpitations or a racing
heart beat.
Urinary tract Pregnant women have Benign Genitourinary More frequent
or bladder to urinate frequently. prostatic bathroom
infection Although this is nearly hypertrophy breaks;
universal in (causing carrying a
pregnancy, it can also overactive bottle of water
be a symptom of a bladder
bladder infection- symptoms in
which is more more than 40
common in percent of men
pregnancy. Urinary over the age of
frequency can result in 60); prostatitis
poor quality sleep as or bladder
well. infections;
diabetes
insipidus;
nonpregnant
urinary tract
infections
Varicose veins Hormonal changes, Also common Cardiovascular More frequent
increased blood flow, in nonpregnant breaks; ability
and increased people (risk to sit or stand
resistance in the pelvis factors include as needed
can cause swelling and family history,
back-filling of veins in obesity and
the legs. This can be liver disease)
painful and worsen as
pregnancy advances,
and is exacerbated by
standing or sedentary
positions.
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